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Abstract: The occurrence of the most critical international economical and financial crisis of the 21st 
century brought into the spotlight the damages that crises can bring to our economy. After its burst in 
the autumn of 2007, the crisis has spread all over the world through the Contagion Effect, and has led 
to an accelerated and sharp deterioration of economic activity. The effects of the episodes of financial 
crises have on the real economy seemed to be more important and persistent in some specific 
countries. For this reason we focused our attention upon eight European transition countries and a 
sample of thirteen financial crises. The aim of this study is to perform an econometric analysis of the 
effects of episodes of financial crises on real output (GDP) for eight economies from Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) using an ARDL equation and an impulse response function. The main findings 
of the paper suggest that, in the case of the CEE economies analyzed, financial crises have an 
important and long-lasting effect, lowering the real output by about 12-14%. 
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1 Introduction 
The financial crisis which started off in the autumn of 2007 in the United States 
and then spread throughout the world through the contagion effect has led to an 
increased deterioration of economic activity in most world economies. Its 
occurrence reopened the debates concerning the real effects of a financial crisis 
(regardless of the form they take) on economies and their duration. The focus of 
this paper is on the impact of different episodes of financial crises on a specific 
panel of economies from Central and Eastern Europe; more specifically, the 
research paper investigates the cases of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary. 
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This study aims to conduct a qualitative and empirical analysis, focusing on the 
case of eight economies from Central and Eastern Europe, of the effects of 
episodes of financial crises on real output. In our scientific approach we focus, at 
the same time, on the losses generated in the economy by an episode of financial 
crisis and we ask ourselves if these losses are permanent or if they can be 
recovered on a medium or long term. This paper is part of a wider analysis of the 
effects of financial crises (seen as adverse effects of economic globalization) on the 
monetary policy instruments used by the central banks throughout the world in 
order to ensure financial and price stability. 
 
2 Theoretical Considerations 
The financial crisis which started off in the autumn of 2007 in the United States 
and then spread throughout the world through the contagion effect has led to an 
increased deterioration of economic activity in most world economies. Its 
occurrence reopened the debates concerning the real effects of a crisis on 
economies and their persistence. 
Economic literature, in general, associates financial crises with major economic 
declines (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009); among the first impact studies concerning 
the real effects of a crisis on economies, it is worth mentioning those belonging to 
(Bagehot, 1873). We take note, however, in economic literature, of a couple of 
studies which mention a null or modest effect of financial crises on the 
performances of an economy (Boyd et al., 2005) and the examples given are 
generally those of developed countries affected by minor (local) crises. As 
concerns the real effects of currency crises (one of the forms of manifestation of 
financial crises), according to the traditional view, a real depreciation, in the case 
of a nominal rigidity, favors exports and boosts output and employment. An 
illustrative example in this respect is the study conducted by Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2006), who identified a positive impact for 40% of the analyzed currency crises. 
Financial crises affect real economy through massive depreciations of the currency 
and increases in the prices of the imported factors of output and of output costs. 
Financial crises affect, at the same time, the behavior of economic agents through 
the increase of uncertainty in relation to future profits and the decrease of the level 
of investments and consumption. In addition, banking crises, as a form of 
manifestation of financial crises, produce a decrease at the level of investments 
through the distress of credit intermediation and of the payments system, following 
the diminution of the values of securities. 
These effects turn out to be more visible and more persistent for emerging 
countries. Actually, emerging economies are more vulnerable to factors which lead 
to the occurrence of crises, such as, for example: the exposure of banks and of 
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private economic agents to maturity mismatches and currency mismatches, distress 
at the level of international capital markets, banking panic or sudden stops of the 
entry of foreign capital. These statements are supported by solid empirical evidence 
in economic literature. Moreover, specialized studies have shown that the effects of 
financial crises on economic activities are bigger for emerging economies than for 
developed economies. For example, Hutchison and Noy (2005) analyzed the effect 
of currency and banking crises on economic output for developed, as well as for 
emerging countries. They noticed, in the case of emerging countries, an average 
decrease of output of 8% (for a period of over 2 years), whereas, in the case of 
developed countries, the average decrease of output was of only 2% (for a period 
of 1 year). In a study conducted by Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008), one could see that 
emerging economies registered a level of real effects of banking crises bigger by 
1.5 percentages than the level registered by developed economies. At the same 
time, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) noticed that the decrease at the level of the GDP, 
following the manifestation of a financial crisis, is much bigger for emerging 
economies than for developed ones. 
In this context, European transition economies (countries belonging to Central and 
Eastern Europe or CEE) are of particular interest from the perspective of the real 
effects of a financial crisis. Moreover, we must see whether the losses generated in 
the economy (in the case of CEE countries) by a financial crisis are permanent or 
whether they are recovered in the short or long run. 
 
3 Particularities of the Countries from Central and Eastern Europe 
The former socialist countries belonging to Central and Eastern Europe registered 
significant changes in their economic structures, changes that are visible primarily 
in the higher living standards and in their increasing integration in the European 
bloc. It is worth mentioning, nevertheless, the imbalances which exist with regard 
to the pace of these processes. For example, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary joined the EU in 2004, whereas 
Bulgaria and Romania adhered to this group in 2007. Slovenia adopted the unique 
European currency in 2007, whereas Slovakia is scheduled to adopt the euro in 
2009. Although they have some similarities with developed economies, the CEE 
countries continue to present the characteristics specific to emerging markets. In 
addition, structural reforms, which may increase the degree of resistance of 
economies to financial shocks, are still in the process of implementation, thus 
increasing the probability for the effects of the financial crises to be bigger and to 
last more in time.  
The global financial crisis which erupted in the autumn of 2007 exposed the 
intrinsic weaknesses of the growth model specific to the CEE countries. Excess 
external funding generated a very big external debt and enabled a fast expansion of 
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credit, especially of foreign currency credit. At the same time, the high internal 
demand in many CEE countries led to overheating, with inflationist pressure and 
substantial (unsustainable) current account deficits. The decrease of liquidities at 
an international level and the pressure exercised on the exchange rates drew 
attention in these countries on the risks of an increased independence in relation to 
the already highly volatile foreign capital.  
Returning to the matter of the large external imbalances (the deficits in current and 
capital accounts) of the CEE economies, these were generated by the rapid GDP 
growth, which was strongly and increasingly based on domestic demand and 
financed by capital inflows. As we can see in Figure 1 most CEE countries have 
encountered significant external imbalances in the period before and during the 
crisis. Exceptions are the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland for whom the 
current and capital account deficits didn’t fell below 10% of GDP.  
 
Figure 1. Combined current and capital account deficit in the CEE economies during 
the 2000-2010 period (% of GDP) 
Source: authors’ calculation using Eurostat data 
Given the fact that most CEE countries, except for Poland, were affected by severe 
recession starting with 2009, we wonder whether the sudden stop of economic 
growth is lasting or whether the economies will register an ascending trend in the 
close future. In many of the CEE countries, the international financial crisis 
increased the volatility of the exchange rate and affected the budgets elaborated by 
the governments, thus causing significant imbalances at the level of economies.  
This paper assesses the impact of financial crises on certain economies from 
Central and Eastern Europe, more specifically on: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary. The main 
characteristics which differentiate these specific economies from CEE from other 
emerging economies are : 1) the CEE countries analyzed have gone through a deep 
and unprecedented process of transformation, from planned to market economy; 
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Romania
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 67
this involved, amongst others, significant investments in assets, as well as in 
human resources, multiple changes of the economic integration model, etc. 2) the 
economies that are part of this study participate to the economic integration 
process; the CEE economies analyzed are EU members (an economic area with a 
high degree of integration on the market of goods, services, capital and, to a certain 
extent, of the workforce) and have adopted European standards at the level of their 
economic policies, institutions and government model. Moreover, the CEE states 
studied will adopt, after meeting the convergence criteria specified in the UE 
treaty, the unique currency, the Euro.  
Separated from the communist bloc, the CEE economies initially collapsed (see 
Figure 2). However, by the middle of the ‘90s, due to various reasons (like the 
process of macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms, low interest rates, a 
rapid development of the financial sectors, the perspective of EU membership etc.), 
the real GDP started to increase again in all the analyzed countries, reflecting 
primarily the results of the macroeconomic stabilization process and of an 
extensive range of structural reforms. 
 
Figure 2. Annual growth of real GDP in the CEE countries during 1990-2010 (%) 
Source: authors’ calculation using World Economic Outlook database 
For example, the average of the annual increase of the real GDP for the CEE 
economies over the 1994-2008 period was 4.7%, with a fast acceleration starting 
with 2000, of approximately one percentage point per year, reaching its maximum 
value, of 7.6%, in 2006. We may notice, at the same time, a strong decrease of the 
analyzed indicator, from 6.6% in 2007 to 1.4% in 2008 to -8.5% in 2009. Despite 
all these, 2010 brought economic growth equal to more than 1% in the studied 
countries. 
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Figure 3. Real GDP per capita in the CEE economies (thousands of Euros per capita) 
Source: authors’ calculation using Eurostat data 
The significant economic performances of the 8ECE countries were also reflected 
in the process of real convergence, described herein as the level of real GDP per 
capita in terms of PPP (see Figure 3). 
 
4 Used Data and Research Methodology 
This paper uses a sample of data on eight countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Romania and Hungary) starting with 1989 and ending with 2010 (annual data). 
In order to achieve the primary objective of this paper, we intend to apply the 
methodology initiated by Romer and Romer (1989) and subsequently developed by 
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) for the purposes of assessing the impact of monetary 
shocks on output. In more concrete terms, we wish to estimate an autoregressive 
equation with distributed lags, also called ARDL function, by using as dependent 
or endogenous variable “the increase of the gross domestic product”, and as 
independent or exogenous variable “the financial crisis”. Starting from here, we 
will calculate the impulse response functions under the form of a chart, estimating 
the confidence bands with the help of the Monte Carlo simulation (by using 1000 
trials) in order to quantify the medium and long term effects of financial crises on 
the economies included in the panel. This method supplements the previous 
attempts of evaluating the costs generated by financial crises by taking into 
consideration short and long term impact. Although there are studies which 
associate some banking and foreign currency crises with short term output losses, 
few of them analyzed whether these losses were recovered in the medium and long 
run. Traditional approaches (initiated by Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2000) take into consideration regressions of the output, with various 
control variables, real time variables and deviations (real growth, real GDP per 
capita) and dummy variables of the financial crises for the panel data of developed 
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and emerging economies (for example, studies conducted by Barro (2001), Bordo et 
al. (2001), Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2006). 
The use of impulse response functions in order to distinguish between the short 
term and long term effects of final crises on the real GDP is a novelty, the pioneers 
of this methodology being Cerra and Saxena (2008). The method was used 
afterwards by European Commission to evaluate the impact of the 2007 financial 
crisis on potential growth, and more recently, by Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) to 
assess the impact of financial crises on output for 11 European transition economies. 
Table 1. Financial crisis episodes in the 8CEE countries 
Country Systemic 
banking crisis 
Currency 
crisis 
Public debt 
crisis 
The starting point of 
the financial crisis 
Bulgaria 1996 – 2002 1996 1990-1991 1990, 1996 2008 
Estonia 1992 – 1999 1992 - 1992, 2008 
Latvia 1995 – 1996 1992 - 1992, 1995, 2008 
Lithuania 1995 – 1996 1992 - 1992, 1995, 2008 
Poland 1992 – 1995 - - 1992, 2008 
Czech 
Republic 1996 – 1998 - 
- 1996, 2008 
Romania 1990 – 1993 1996 - 1990, 1996, 2008 
Hungary 1991 – 1995 - - 1991, 2008 
Source: authors’ calculation using World Economic Outlook database; including Laeven 
and Valencia (2008), Cecchetti (1999), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011) and Frydl (1999) for 
determining the starting point and the duration of the financial crisis 
For the purposes of this analysis, we will use the IMF database (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008) for the financial crisis episodes from the 1990-2007 period, to 
which we will also add the international financial crisis which broke out in 2007 
(we will refer to 2008). Table 1 lists the episodes of financial crisis used in this study. 
In order to determine the impact and duration of the effects of financial crises on 
economic growth, we will use an autoregressive equation. An autoregressive 
equation with distributed lags of the order p and n or ARDL (p,n), for a scalar 
variable yt has the following structure (equation 1): 
ti-t
1
ii-t
1
it εxbyacy +++= ∑∑
==
n
i
p
i
 
(1) 
where,  
c is the intercept,  
tε  is the error term, a scalar of zero mean, 
tx  is column vector with dimension K,  
ia  is a scalar while ib  is a vector. 
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The model which we intend to estimate is an ARDL (p, n) model presented in the 
form of equation 2. 
 ti,j-ti,
1
jj- ti,
1
jiti, εCFbLPIBracLPIBr ++∆+=∆ ∑∑
==
n
j
p
j
 (2) 
where, 
ti,LPIBr  is the natural (or Napierian) logarithm function of real output (PIBr) for 
country i at moment t, 
ci is a constant and it is used to capture the specific characteristics of a country (i) 
that are unobservable, 
j-ti,CF is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a country (i) is passing 
through an episode of financial crisis in moment t and 0 if otherwise, 
ia  and ib  are parameters which explain the influence of the observed variables 
upon the dependent variable ( ti,LPIBr∆ ). 
We will test the number of lags for the equation (2) starting from ARDL (1,1) and 
we will increase their number until an additional lag no longer produces an effect 
on the analyzed variable. When it existed, heteroscedasticity was corrected, and the 
problem of self-correlation with regard to the dependent variable is solved by 
involving the values of lags as explanatory values. 
All the necessary information is taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook. The data are analyzed using the panel data 
approach and consists of annual observations from the period 1989-2010 for the 8 
CEE economies. The episodes of financial crises (currency crisis, banking crisis 
and sovereign debt crisis) are presented in Table 1 one along with the sources of 
the data. 
 
5 Results 
During the first stage, we have estimated an equation of the impact and persistence 
of financial crises on the real GDP in the 8 analyzed ECE economies (equation 3) 
by using a single lag, namely ARDL (1, 1). 
1-ti,1ti,01- ti,1iti, CFbCFbLPIBracLPIBr ++∆+=∆  (3) 
The econometric estimates specific to this equation are presented in Table no. 2. 
According to the econometric findings in Table 2, at the level of the data panel, the 
increase of the value of the indicator “real GDP” is influenced both by the 
economic growth registered during the previous year and by the dummy variable 
which describes the financial crisis episodes. We may notice a visible 
contemporary effect of financial crises on the increase of the real GDP. 
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All the parameters corresponding to the exogenous variables in equation (3) are 
statistically significant at a confidence level of 99%. The value of F-statistic is 29.7 
and the probability associated with it is smaller than 0.001%, which makes the 
estimated equation statistically significant for a confidence level of 99%. The 
analyzed variables account for approximately 36% (values of the determination 
coefficients R2 and 2R ) of the behavior of the dependent variable (that is, the 
modification of the logarithm values of the increases of the real GDP), the 
difference being caused by other factors included in the error term (
 ti,ε ). 
According to the Durbin Watson stat (DW) test, the value of 1.75 is below the limit 
(of approximately 2), which means that there is not serial correlation of the errors.  
Table 2 Econometric estimations for the ARDL (1, 1) equation 
Dependent Variable: ∆LPIBri,t  
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Date: 07/08/11   Time: 00:09   
Sample (adjusted): 1992 2010   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 8   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 152  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     
C 0.023776*** 0.006389 3.721128 0.0003 
∆LPIBri,t-1 0.501132*** 0.065563 7.643500 0.0000 
CFi,t -0.041998*** 0.011340 -3.703489 0.0003 
CFi,t-1 -0.016468*** 0.011969 -3.775943 0.0009 
     
     
R-squared 0.375834     Mean dependent var 0.022526 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363182     S.D. dependent var 0.068660 
S.E. of regression 0.054791     Akaike info criterion -2.944614 
Sum squared resid 0.444306     Schwarz criterion -2.865039 
Log likelihood 227.7907     F-statistic 29.70550 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.751762 
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
Note: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and at 10% confidence level 
In conclusion, regarding the estimated ARDL (1, 1) equation, both the real output 
growth from the previous year (which was affected or not by a financial crisis) as 
well as the financial crisis dummy variable with one lag, affect economic growth at 
time t. We now focus our attention on assessing the impact and the persistence of 
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financial crises on real GDP in the 8CEE economies (equation 4) using 2 lags, i.e. 
ARDL (2, 2). 
2-ti,21-ti,1ti,02- ti,21- ti,1iti, CFbCFbCFbLPIBraLPIBracLPIBr +++∆+∆+=∆  (4) 
We use the “trial and error” method. For reasons of space the table with the results 
for the equation (4) was not inserted in the paper. According to the individual tests 
– the t-statistic as well as the F-statistic – applied to the model, all the coefficients 
from the regression equation are statistically significant at a 0.1%. The analyzed 
variables explain almost 44% of the variation that the dependent variables has (i.e. 
the variance of the log of real output), the difference being caused by other factors 
included in the error term (
 ti,ε ). In conclusion, like in the ARDL (1, 1) equation, 
the estimated ARDL (2, 2) equation proves that economic growth at time t is 
affected by the real output growth from the previous year as well as the financial 
crisis dummy variable with two lags. 
In equation (5) we computed the parameters for the ARDL (3, 3) model. 
3-ti,32-ti,21-ti,1
ti,03- ti,32- ti,21- ti,1iti,
CFbCFbCFb
CFbLPIBraLPIBraLPIBracLPIBr
+++
++∆+∆+∆+=∆
 
(5) 
As we are introducing more lags, the effects of financial crisis on economic growth 
are disappearing (or at least estimates of the parameters for dummy variables are 
found to be statistically insignificant). According to individual tests – t-statistic and 
F-statistic tests – almost all of the regression equation coefficients are statistically 
significant at a level of relevance of 0.1%. Analyzed variables explain around 45% 
of the behavior of the dependent variable, the difference being caused by other 
factors included in the error term (
 ti,ε ). 
Table 3. Econometric estimations for the ARDL (3, 3) equation 
Dependent Variable: ∆LPIBri,t   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Date: 07/08/11   Time: 00:13   
Sample (adjusted): 1994 2010   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
Cross-sections included: 8   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 136  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.028951*** 0.006175 4.688040 0.0000 
∆LPIBri,t-1 0.439473*** 0.091953 4.779321 0.0000 
∆LPIBri,t-2 -0.015370*** 0.097271 -0.158010 0.8747 
∆LPIBri,t-3 -0.090306*** 0.075269 -1.199784 0.2324 
CFi,t -0.028689*** 0.010106 -2.838904 0.0053 
CFi,t-1 -0.026477*** 0.012384 -2.138051 0.0344 
CFi,t-2 -0.049235*** 0.011867 4.149053 0.0001 
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CFi,t-3 -0.010772*** 0.010120 -3.064411 0.0889 
     
     
R-squared 0.471741     Mean dependent var 0.033003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.459024     S.D. dependent var 0.052376 
S.E. of regression 0.041604     Akaike info criterion -3.464206 
Sum squared resid 0.221557     Schwarz criterion -3.292874 
Log likelihood 243.5660     F-statistic 12.27918 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.037696 
    Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
Note: ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and at 10% confidence level 
 
When performing these calculations we must pay attention also to information 
criteria (Akaike Info Criterion and Schwarz Criterion) that will help us choose the 
correct model (their values should be as small as possible because they measure the 
information lost in a given model). Sometimes the author is constrained to take a 
critical decision when choosing between models: either chose the model with big 
values for the R-squared / adjusted R-squared, but with the sacrifice of higher 
values for the information criteria or a model with low values for the information 
criteria but with the sacrifice of small values for the R2 and 2R . 
In equation (6) we have computed the parameters for the ARDL (4, 4) equation. 
4-ti,43-ti,32-ti,21-ti,1
ti,04- ti,43- ti,32- ti,21- ti,1iti,
CFbCFbCFbCFb
CFbLPIBraLPIBraLPIBraLPIBracLPIBr
++++
++∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
 
(6
) 
Looking at the results of the regressions for the ARDL (4, 4) and at the data 
presented in Tables 3 we are convinced that in order to evaluate the impact and 
persistence of financial crisis on GDP in the case of the 8CEE economies, 3 lags are 
necessary (being the fact that all 3 lags are statistically significant) in the ARDL 
equation. Thus, regarding the estimates of the financial crisis dummy for all the 
lags presented in Table 3 we can deduct that, in the case of the 8CEE economies, 
the occurrence of a financial crisis in moment t generates a decrease in output in the 
long run (in three years) by almost 11.49%. The validity of the data can be verified 
by using the impulse response function (which we can generate based on equation 
(5) and the parameters estimated and presented in table no. 3). By simulating a 
crisis episode with a one year’ duration (the impulse), we generate the increase of 
the real GDP index (the response). Subsequently, this is included in a band with a 
confidence level of 95%, generated with the help of the Monte-Carlo simulation for 
1000 trials. According to Figure 4, the impulse response function confirms the 
previously obtained results, namely the fact that financial crises have significant 
effects on the increase of the real GDP throughout three lags (respectively 3 years). 
By applying the index of Leaven and Valencia (2008), the financial crises decrease 
the level of growth of the real GDP by approximately 14% in the long run (a result 
close to the value of 11.49%, obtained by using the ARDL model).  
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Figure 4. Impact of financial crises on economic growth in the 8ECE countries 
The findings of this study are in agreement with those obtained by Furceri and 
Zdzienicka (2011), who quantify a cumulative loss of output of 17% as a result of 
the manifestation of financial crises for a number of 11 countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe, or with those reported by Cerra and Saxena (2008), who measure 
the magnitude of long-term effects of financial crises by using a data panel made 
up of several transition economies. At the same time, the findings confirm the 
observations concerning the fact that the impact of banking and twin crises 
(banking and currency crises) on output is bigger than the impact of currency crises 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, (1999). 
 
6 Conclusions 
The primary objective of this study is to assess, based on some econometric 
analyses, the effects of financial crises on real output for 8 states from Central and 
Eastern Europe. Our scientific study relies on the methodology employed by 
Romer and Romer (1989) and involves the estimate of an ARDL equation based on 
a data panel comprised of 13 financial crises which occurred in the 8ECE states 
over the 1989-2010 period. The findings obtained as a result of the empirical 
analysis led us to the conclusion that financial crises have a significant and lasting 
effect (on the short term, as well as on the long term) on economic growth. As 
concerns the 8ECE economies, in particular, the occurrence of financial crises 
caused a decrease of the real output of approximately 3 percentage points after a 
year (the contemporary effect) and of 12-14 percentage points after a 4 years’ 
period. The findings of this study turned out to be in agreement with the ones 
obtained by Furceri and Zdzienicka (2011), who quantify a cumulative loss of 
output of 17% as a result of the occurrence of financial crises for a number of 11 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
∆ 
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